term impacts which have revitalised autonomous, grassroots trade unionism and often crossborder labor exchanges two decades later.
Although NAFTA was the first regional economic integration agreement between developed and underdeveloped countries, the discussion has wider significance today. labor movements tend to be at a much earlier stage in learning how to effectively utilise such labor side accords and dispute settlement mechanisms to improve workers' rights. Thus, leaders and activists elsewhere may usefully reflect upon the lessons that can be learned from twenty years of campaigning around the accord in Mexico, the U.S. and Canada.
While NAFTA was designed principally to benefit US and Canadian multinationals, many of their national policymakers were concerned that if too many of their corporations relocated their plants to their southern neighbour (where production costs were significantly cheaper and industrial regulation far weaker), it would damage their own economies and create unemployment. Therefore the NAALC labor side accord was incorporated into the broader Agreement and enabled activists, trade unions and civil society groups to mount legal challenges to a National Administrative Office (NAO) -that was to be established within each country's labor ministry -in cases where the petitioners believed that domestic labor laws had been breached by multinationals operating there. 3 Its inclusion allowed President
Clinton to secure enough Democrat votes in the House of Representatives for NAFTA to obtain Congressional assent, while providing him with 'political cover' to execute the deal without completely alienating his labor union sponsors. 4 However, what made this significant was that under the auspices of the NAALC's Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC), the procedures involved in raising complaints meant that alleged violations of domestic labor standards by a multinational could only be adjudicated by an NAO from one of the other two member states, not the one where the infringement had actually occurred. Thus the accord provided transnational 'institutionalised political opportunity structures' to contest the rules of global economic integration for the first time because it made communication, information-sharing and cooperation between the affected trade union or labor advocate that was making the petition and the unions, labor lawyers and anti-free trade coalitions in the third-party country of the review body essential. 5 Literature on the impact of regional economic integration institutions on transnational labor movements has, until recently, reflected two main debates. The first discusses how regional integration provides opportunities for transnational political mobilisation; the second addresses how effective ensuing transnational labor cooperation has been in concrete terms. 6 Work on NAFTA has paid particular attention to the extent to which the NAALC has achieved both these ends.
The NAALC has been dismissed as an ineffective tool for achieving either goal because it does not establish minimum regional labor standards. 7 On the other hand, NAO
review bodies are open to political manipulation, and violations of fundamental labor standards such as the right of assembly, strike and collective bargaining are not subject to sanctions or binding arbitration. 8 These weaknesses have acted as such a deterrent that unions in the three countries filed just 39 cases under this process between 1994 and 2011. Only seven of these have reached the final 'ministerial consultation' stage and not a single one has generated sanctions. 9 petition process since NAOs provided an institutionalised channel for transnational engagement between North American unions. 10 By establishing a forum for exposing the inadequacies of national labor laws, it is argued that this process creates government accountability indirectly, because regardless of the outcome of the petition itself, the resulting bad publicity and scrutiny can be enough to force the alleged law-violating company to change its policy. For example, Nike's directors acceded to the maquiladora (the Mexican name for manufacturing operations in a free trade zone) garment workers' demand for an independent trade union in Kukdong in January 2001, when they recognised that Nike's corporate image would suffer globally. However this was only after international activist networks and unions leveraged the original NAO petition to expose the company in the media. 11 Moreover it is argued that the 'Ministerial consultations' that transnational union pressure succeeded in achieving following NAO arbitration, have had lasting legacies by ensuring that governments implemented their own labor legislation. 12 For instance, the outcome of the Han Young case (1997) led to a partial opening up of Mexico's entrenched corporatist industrial relations system. Until then, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) only recognised pro-government labor actors such as the Mexican Workers' Confederation (CTM), but was forced into providing a publically available portal that also promoted independent trade unions from that point onward.
This article takes these debates forward and synthesises them with other literature. It illustrates how the experience of cross-border opposition to NAFTA caused Canadian, American and Mexican labor movements to reappraise their national organising structures and often inward-looking political perspectives to eventually adopt more internationalist outlooks. NAFTA may therefore be seen as a 'transformative event 'that prompted these movements to realise their capacity to organise transnationally rather than resorting to protectionist strategies. 13 It also shows that the cross-border alliances and collective repertoires of protest first acquired by labor activists during the early NAFTA years have developed into quasi-permanent mobilisation structures that still operate today. . 16 However, while these campaign networks
were not labor-focused, they included federations like the AFL-CIO and individual unions like the United Auto Workers in the U.S. and Mexico's Authentic Workers Front (FAT). As an independent union confederation that also incorporates community organisations, peasant movements and women's groups, FAT is committed to principles of internationalism, workers' self-management and training. It operates in parallel to the official CTM confederation which, in contrast, the state uses to discipline the workforce and demobilise labor opposition. 17 However, without an institutional focal point to rally around in the years preceding the Agreement, the FAT struggled to persuade the main Canadian and American unions to form a tri-national anti-NAFTA labor alliance. 18 Several hurdles confined such attempts at worker transnationalism to the periphery of the labor movement during these early stages; those initiatives that did emerge were mainly reduced to superficial 'contingent political alliances' whose objectives were often short-termist and did not extend beyond opposing NAFTA.
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The CTM was by far the largest Mexican union confederation. However, its corporatist relationship with the government plus its genuine belief that NAFTA would help create millions of jobs through inward investment meant that it refused to participate in any cross-border labor opposition. 20 Dissident voices in Mexico were loud, but weak. Independent unions accounted for just 10% of all membership in the early-1990s and FAT itself boasted no more than 50,000 members. 21 The Mexican labor movement therefore remained ideologically dominated by the pro-NAFTA CTM, which also used nationalist rhetoric to deride the FAT as a tool of foreign unions wishing to prevent jobs from coming to Mexico.
This accusation resonated powerfully in a society which was profoundly distrustful of US motivations ever since its interference in the 1910 Revolution. Thus, Mexican workers refrained from engaging in projects that promoted solidarity with their American counterparts, while the CTM's hegemony over Mexican labor meant that both alternative unions and opposition to NAFTA were marginalised. 22 Moreover, in the years immediately before the Agreement's 1994 implementation, the CTM's nationalism was met by a resolutely protectionist stance from the AFL-CIO. As xenophobic cultural traditions permeated sections of the US labor movement, its leaders tended to blame foreign workers for NAFTA-related job losses. 23 Unions. 24 This contributed to the AFL-CIO's reluctance to build meaningful alliances with the very Mexican unions that were most active in opposing NAFTA. Additional impediments to the development of cross-border ties in the years preceding NAFTA's implementation included language, cultural and resource-based disparities. 25 Finally, workers in the same industry in each country were often unionised in different ways, making it more difficult to identify the appropriate partner with whom to form alliances. Specific sectors were sometimes unionised in one country but not in another and industry-specific unions that operated under the centralised control of a governing confederation in one country were, at times, completely decentralised in another. 26 Thus, the only significant transnational labor relationships that emerged in the run up to NAFTA were confined both geographically to the U.S.-Mexico border area where the environmental damage and degrees of labor exploitation were experienced most intensely, and organisationally to those small and independent union federations that possessed more internationalist ideologies and which shared histories of cross-border labor cooperation prior to the Agreement. Notably, having lost 10,000 manufacturing jobs to Mexico in the 1980s, and foreseeing the potential for further large-scale job losses, the left-leaning, internationalist-oriented American union -United Electrical (UE), forged a partnership with FAT in 1992, to collectively bargain with their common employers at General Electric. 27 This Strategic Organising Alliance targeted US-owned maquila plants along the border areas in northern Mexico and blossomed into a sustainable, multi-layered and reciprocal relationship.
The UE's organising principle which convinced their members of the need for solidarity was astoundingly simple: relatively low wages in Mexico would inevitably result in
American multinationals deciding to relocate, which would generate mass redundancies in US firms. Therefore, fighting for and supporting Mexican workers would not only help increase pay and improve conditions there, but would simultaneously preserve American jobs and relieve downward pressure on US wages due to the higher costs of relocation. 28 In its promotion of unrestricted competition between workers, NAFTA also generated adverse effects on employment, wages and bargaining power in all three countries. Some two million mainly low-skilled manufacturing jobs were lost in the US and Canada during the first 10 years. 30 This was due to the Agreement's tariff elimination stipulations that facilitated US and Canadian corporations' moves to shift production and investment to Mexico, where, to encourage them further, environmental regulation could be more easily avoided and labor costs were up to 10 times lower. 31 As American and Canadian unions realised the extent of job losses that had resulted from the treaty towards the late 1990s, it became obvious that their protectionist strategies had failed. They perceived an urgent need to adopt a transnational approach. 32 Mexican workers were even more severely affected. 33 Despite the Agreement's architects promising that foreign investment would bring unprecedented growth for Mexico, the country's per capita GDP declined in 1995 and barely increased during the 2000s. 34 It remained six times lower than that of the United States in 2010. 35 Nor did the Mexican economy benefit, or its workers gain from NAFTA's expected 'convergence effects'. When
President Salinas' neoliberal administration abolished the ejido communal land-holding system (previously enshrined in the 1917 Constitution), millions of small farmers were evicted from their land and forced to migrate to the urban centres. Import tariffs and subsidies to domestic enterprises were also removed, leading many small and medium-sized firms to go bankrupt. The resulting sudden availability of hundreds of thousands unemployed small businessmen and farmers in the cities where maquila factories were based, helped depress manufacturing wages and growth. 36 Between 1995 and 1999, Mexican wages fell by approximately 24% and only returned to pre-NAFTA levels in 2006.
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Of the new jobs created by NAFTA-induced investment, 98% were in the maquiladora sector where remuneration rates were up to four times lower than in other areas of Mexican manufacturing that pre-dated the Agreement. 38 This fuelled a downward spiralling of wages and greatly widened the wage gap between Mexican and US workers between 1994
and 1996 by over fifty percent. 39 These negative impacts undermined the bargaining position of Canadian and American labor and aggravated the deterioration of working conditions in all three countries. Even the CTM had little choice but to reverse its original belief that the NAFTA was a means to attain improved living standards for Mexican workers. opportunities. 41 On the one hand, NAALC defined eleven common regional labor rights for the first time, helping workers to construct a collective, geopolitical identity across borders.
On the other, it granted a legitimising power to North American unions to campaign to defend these rights because they were now legally recognised. Before NAFTA, they could easily be dismissed by governments or courts as unjustified campaigns inspired by little more than worker self-interest. 42 With the AFL-CIO and CTM uninvolved in the legal challenges made through the NAALC until later years, the FAT and the UE gained enormous prestige within their respective labor movements by pursuing the defence of national labor rights through the accord's arbitration process. 43 These marginal unions were soon brought into the spotlight, which in turn, forced key labor actors in the US and Canada to readdress their positions by seeking to emulate the FAT-UE model and develop their own transnational labor relationships, while also exploring the possibilities of resolving disputes through the NAALC's resolution process. 44 While the AFL-CIO continued to work closely with the CTM, from 1997, in a clear change of direction, its leaders finally began to meet with and provide assistance to the FAT and other independent Mexican unions. 45 It aided Mexican flight attendants in numerous NAO cases and participated in virtually every NAALC petition filed since 1997. 46 In the meantime, in Canada during the late-1990s, several unions either disaffiliated or demanded greater autonomy from their American-dominated international confederations. This facilitated more proactive stances in building relationships with independent Mexican unions. 47 The UE-FAT relationship became tri-national in 1997 when the Canadian Steelworkers Union (CUSWA) joined them alongside several other unions to form the Echlin Workers Alliance that supported auto parts workers to improve working conditions in all three countries. 48 The establishment of transnational North American labor relations can be attributed largely to political agency and to the role of several peripheral, autonomous, industry-specific and left-wing trade union organizations prior to the Agreement. Yet it was the structural conditions that NAFTA occasioned which presented a sufficient 'shock' that prompted the larger, traditionally nationalist, central labor actors to reassess the regional free trade project and so broaden these relationships within these labor movements. A realisation of their common interests with workers across the border, together with the 'institutionalised political opportunities' presented by the NAALC labor dispute resolution mechanism, brought them to engage more heavily in these attempts to construct transnational alliances.
As Kay notes, this turn of events is unsurprising. 49 Analysts who emphasize the importance of institutions describe how legal or policy changes that provoke severe shocks to organizational fields often generate strategy transformations by organizations, including unions. 50 Social movement scholars have demonstrated how-as in this case-these behavioral shifts usually only happen once these threats become real rather than anticipated. The education programmes are now enjoying growing enrolment that extends far beyond factory plants and into the services sector, especially among taxi and local government workers.
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The advanced stage of transnationalism shared among activists in the two unions is based upon a strong sense of mutual interest or 'identification'. It has partly been the product of sustained education programmes and rank-and-file worker exchanges, speaking tours and protest rallies. 53 In taking information about labor rights and union organising back to their local communities and workplaces, stereotypes, cultural and linguistic barriers which had atomised their struggles are being addressed. Second, while the PRI's electoral defeat seemingly provided new opportunities for Mexican unions to break with the corporatist system, President Fox soon sought to renew that tradition. By promising old union leaders that their privileged access to government would be maintained in exchange for their 'guarantee of social stability,' he was able to push through further neoliberal reform virtually unchallenged. 57 The newly-installed PAN administration also responded to independent labor challenges with ferocious coercion, tightly controlling public meetings on labor issues and reducing possibilities for those endorsing transnational approaches.
Finally, quasi-legal channels were almost completely abandoned as a form of crossborder labor cooperation because of a general deterioration in state-to-state relations, especially between the US and Mexico. 58 Growing tensions over undocumented migrant workers and America's erection of a long 'security fence' along the border in 2006 fuelled these antagonisms. 59 The signing of the 2008 Mérida Initiative between the two countries transformed the bilateral relationship into one that focuses on security issues rather than on trade and labor, and was symbolic of a shift in U.S. priorities since 9/11. The election of Obama in 2009 represented continuity rather than change in this respect. 60 These issues have exposed the accord's susceptibility to national policy agendas, as well as its temporality as a means for providing a longer-term platform for labor solidarity.
However, whilst traditional forms of labor protest -strikes, marches, boycotts and pickets - 
Lessons and legacies for labor transnationalism
While these decentralised or autonomous transnational networks have emerged during Phase 3, similar informal, grassroots collectives also existed during Phases 1 and 2. Examples were
Mujer a Mujer (an organisation of non-unionised female garment industry workers) and The
North American Worker-to-Worker Network (a coalition that sponsored activists' tours), which were especially active in NAFTA's early days. 64 However, the difference was that NAALC's deterioration shifted the focal point for transnational contention away from projects and towards rank-and-file initiatives and expanded the scale of such initiatives.
These forms of interaction epitomise the sort of 'mini-lateral' links advocated by
Croucher and Cotton for developing international union work. 65 They argue that small groups of activists from adjacent countries, especially where they conduct union educational activities, can raise their potential for collective action. Exogenously aiding these opportunities is the cultural hybridity -inadvertently promoted by NAFTA as an extension of existing 'Tex-Mex' culture -which began in the U.S.-Mexico border region during the maquila-boom of the 1990s, and has since been creeping into mainland USA. Strong stereotyping nevertheless continues to exist, especially due to recent fears about Mexican immigration, and that lends greater significance to these activities. 66 One lesson which may be drawn from the FAT/UE/CUSWA alliance is that the success of future transnational labor relationships may depend upon a genuinely symmetrical relationship that moves away from framing Mexican workers as powerless 'victims'. Sustained, cross-border labor partnerships were able to enhance their mobilisation opportunities against NAFTA by uniting their campaigns, in what has been theorised as an example of a Transnational Alliance System. 73 Such alliances require 'support structures' which help them elicit internal and external resources, raise issues and make allies. Here it has been argued that the NAALC's citizen-participation mechanism to file cases for arbitration provided such a structure for North American labor to register contention and build solidarity over free trade issues. However, instead of acting as a support structure that aided these immediate campaigns, it has been proposed here that the accord's petitions process fulfilled this function in terms of subsequent cross-border struggles. It did so because it acted as a catalyst in the development of mutual trust between Mexican, Canadian and American workers that led unions and activists to create more permanent spaces for crossborder solidarity. The Alliance Systems which emerged during the third phase outlined above, were decentralised and have helped to fortify NAFTA countries' transnational labor efforts to oppose current attempts to expand the regional free trade area into the Pacific Rim. . 74 Until such time as these problems are overcome, the impact of transnational worker struggles will generally remain of secondary importance to national campaigns, despite holding enormous potential for international labor.
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Conclusion
Ēlite-driven, regional economic integration projects which institutionalise the process of globalisation contain contradictions that provide potential opportunities for workers to construct transnational alliances to contest the increased intensity of their exploitation that such projects inevitably engender.
It was precisely when formal, institutionalised and élite-level channels for crossborder labor cooperation broke down during the early-2000s that activists began to understand that they required alternative, grassroots educational and mobilisation vehicles at transnational level in addition to strikes, pickets, demonstrations, boycotts and other forms of direct action. It was these that would strengthen and maintain transnational solidarity through troughs in the 'protest cycle' 76 beyond phases of heightened conflict. The experience of the last twenty years suggests that NAFTA has helped stimulate solidarity between labor movements in the US, Canada and Mexico. The assumption among Canadian and American workers that they would lose out to their Mexican counterparts proved to be unfounded, which opened spaces for more meaningful cooperation.
The Agreement's labor accord provided activists with a forum for cross-border organising and although its enforcement mechanisms were weak, the NAALC petitions process necessitated more regular and longer-term contact between unions in the three countries than had previously been the case. 77 Institutions that foster regional economic integration elsewhere such as MERCOSUR in South America, ASEAN in South Asia, and COMESA in Africa have not been able to generate longer-term transnational labor cooperation with the same degree of success, precisely because they have offered no meaningful participatory mechanism for expressing and redressing grievances when labor rights are violated.
The NAFTA experience also suggests that labor side accords are not primary vehicles for cross-border worker solidarity. Unlike other forms of transnational cooperation, legal activities confine participation to groups of trade union officials and lawyers rather than rank-and-file activists. 78 Nevertheless, they may still offer useful legal and political platforms for labor activists. They provide room to ameliorate the negative immediate effects of free trade agreements on labor standards and may also aid initial cross-border resistance. The transnational cooperation that they help to foster through these legalistic mechanisms is a necessary precursor for the development of deeper alliances between national trade unions. This is so because the interactions and trust that NAO petitioning generates between workers cross-nationally permit a mutual identification of interests. These provide the basis for longer-term autonomous and grassroots labor solidarity actions which may emerge organically and independently of the original institutionalised, top-down processes. To this extent, they are starting to stimulate a number of counter-currents within neo-liberal globalisation.
